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AFFECT MISATTRIBUTION PROCEDURE  2 
Abstract 
The affect misattribution procedure (AMP) is one of the most promising implicit measures to 
date, showing high reliability and large effect sizes. The current research tested three potential 
sources of priming effects in the AMP: affective feelings, semantic concepts, and prepotent 
motor responses. Ruling out prepotent motor responses as a driving force, priming effects on 
evaluative and semantic target responses occurred regardless of whether the key assignment in 
the task was fixed or random. Moreover, priming effects emerged for affect-eliciting primes in 
the absence of semantic knowledge about the primes. Finally, priming effects were independent 
of the order in which primes and targets were presented, suggesting that AMP effects are driven 
by misattribution rather than biased perceptions of the targets. Taken together, these results 
support accounts that attribute priming effects in the AMP to a general misattribution mechanism 
that can operate on either affective feelings or semantic concepts.  
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Implicit measures arguably represent one of the most important additions to the tool-box 
of research instruments in the recent history of psychology (Payne & Gawronski, 2010). In 
contrast to traditional explicit measures, implicit measures assess mental contents by means of 
performance-based paradigms that do not require a verbal report of these contents. As such, 
implicit measures are often regarded as particularly useful to assess mental contents that people 
might be unwilling or unable to report (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Although the relation 
between implicit and explicit measures turned out to involve a more complex interplay of factors 
that go beyond introspective limits and differential susceptibility to social desirability 
(Gawronski, LeBel, & Peters, 2007; Hofmann, Gschwendner, Nosek, & Schmitt, 2005), the 
exponentially growing number of studies using implicit measures clearly attests to their 
usefulness as a window into people’s minds (for an overview, see Gawronski & Payne, 2010).  
Despite their popularity, however, a significant concern about implicit measures is the 
wide range of reliability estimates they have revealed in empirical studies. Whereas some 
implicit measures consistently show reliabilities that are comparable to explicit measures, others 
show reliabilities that are clearly unsatisfactory (Gawronski & De Houwer, in press). These 
differences may at least partly account for the popularity of the implicit association test (IAT; 
Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), which was the first implicit measure that consistently 
revealed satisfying psychometric properties. However, the IAT has also been criticized for 
several structural characteristics that question the internal validity of its measurement scores (see 
Teige-Mocigemba, Klauer, & Sherman, 2010). These concerns have inspired the development of 
new procedures that overcome the structural problems of the IAT. 
One of the most promising alternatives to the IAT to date is the affect misattribution 
procedure (AMP; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005). Similar to the IAT, the AMP has 
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consistently shown high reliability and large effect sizes. At the same time, the AMP employs 
the theoretically simpler structure of sequential priming, which makes it less susceptible to 
methodological criticism than the IAT (Payne & Gawronski, 2010). Nevertheless, the 
mechanisms underlying the AMP are still not well-understood, which is essential for evaluations 
of its internal validity and construct-appropriate interpretations of its measurement scores 
(Nosek, Hawkins, & Frazier, 2011). The main goal of the current research was to address this 
concern by testing three potential sources of priming effects in the AMP: (1) affective feelings, 
(2) semantic concepts, (3) prepotent motor responses.  
Affect Misattribution Procedure 
The AMP is a sequential priming task inspired by an earlier study by Murphy and Zajonc 
(1993). On a typical AMP trial, participants are briefly presented with a positive or negative 
prime stimulus which is followed by an evaluatively neutral target stimulus—usually a Chinese 
ideograph. After a short delay, the target stimulus is replaced by a black-and-white pattern mask 
and participants are asked to indicate if they consider the target stimulus as visually more 
pleasant or visually less pleasant than the average Chinese ideograph. The modal finding is that 
the targets are evaluated more favorably when participants have been primed with a positive 
stimulus than when they have been primed with a negative stimulus. Although such influences 
may seem rather obvious and easy to control, priming effects in the AMP have been shown to be 
unaffected by explicit instructions to avoid the influence of the primes even when participants 
received detailed information on how the primes influence responses to the targets (Payne et al., 
2005).  
In the original presentation of the AMP, Payne et al. (2005) reported an average internal 
consistency of .88 (Cronbach’s α) and a mean effect size of 1.25 (Cohen’s d). These properties 
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have been confirmed in a recent summary of reliability estimates revealed by different implicit 
measures, with estimates reported for the AMP varying between .70 and .90 (Gawronski & De 
Houwer, in press). Evidence for its construct validity comes from various studies, showing that 
AMP scores reveal patterns of results that are consistent with current theorizing about implicit 
measures. For example, in a study by Payne et al. (2005), the relation between implicit prejudice 
measured by the AMP and explicit prejudice measured by a feeling thermometer was moderated 
by individual differences in the motivation to control prejudiced reactions (Dunton & Fazio, 
1997), such that implicit and explicit prejudice were positively related for participants low in 
motivation to control, but not for those high in motivation to control. Additional support comes 
from studies demonstrating its validity in predicting judgments and behavior (for a meta-
analysis, see Cameron, Brown-Iannuzzi, & Payne, 2012), including voting decisions (Payne et 
al., 2010), addictive behavior (Payne, McClernon, & Dobbins, 2007), sexual preferences 
(Imhoff, Schmidt, Bernhardt, Dierksmeier, & Banse, 2011), and moral judgments (Hofmann & 
Baumert, 2010). AMP scores have also been shown to vary in theoretically meaningful ways in 
response to experimental manipulations of attitudes (cf. De Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, 
& Moors, 2009), including pairings of neutral conditioned stimuli and valenced unconditioned 
stimuli in evaluative conditioning (Rydell & Jones, 2009), descriptive information about targets 
(Gawronski, Rydell, Vervliet, & De Houwer, 2010; Rydell & Gawronski, 2009), and newly 
created associations between an attitude object and the self (Gawronski & LeBel, 2008; 
Prestwich, Perugini, Hurling, & Richetin, 2010). 
Underlying Mechanisms 
Payne et al. (2005) argued that priming effects in the AMP are due to the misattribution 
of the affective feelings that are elicited by the primes to the evaluatively neutral targets. 
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According to this account, the primes cause rudimentary pleasant or unpleasant feelings, 
depending on their affective quality. Although these feelings are subjectively experienced by the 
participants, they may be unaware of the processes that gave rise to their momentary affective 
state. As a result, the feeling elicited by the prime may be mistakenly attributed to the target, 
unless the affective state is less diffuse and bound to a specific object such as the prime (Oikawa, 
Aarts, & Oikawa, 2011).  
Although misattribution of affective feelings explains the effects of prime stimuli with a 
clear affective quality, it is unable to explain priming effects of semantic stimuli in AMP variants 
using non-evaluative, semantic judgments. For example, Deutsch and Gawronski (2009) asked 
participants to guess whether the Chinese ideographs depicted an animate or inanimate object 
after being presented with word primes referring to animate or inanimate objects. Participants 
were more likely to guess that the Chinese ideograph depicted an animate object when they were 
primed with an animate object than when they were primed with inanimate object (see also 
Imhoff et al., 2011; Sava et al., 2012). The available evidence for priming effects on non-
evaluative, semantic judgments has led some researchers to conclude that priming effects in the 
AMP might be driven by the activation of “cold” semantic concepts rather than “hot” affective 
feelings (e.g., Blaison, Imhoff, Hühnel, Hess, & Banse, 2012). According to this account, 
positive and negative primes may influence responses to the targets by activating the semantic 
concepts of good versus bad or pleasant versus unpleasant. Although these concepts are clearly 
evaluative, they may not necessarily involve the activation of “hot” affective feelings, as 
suggested by Payne et al.’s (2005) original account.  
To test the contribution of affective feelings versus semantic concepts to priming effects 
in the AMP, Blaison et al. (2012) used a modified version of the task in which participants’ were 
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asked to judge whether the Chinese ideograph visually evoked either fear or anger. Shortly 
before the presentation of target stimuli, participants were primed with pictures of either angry or 
fearful faces. Their results showed that angry face primes increased the likelihood of judging a 
given ideograph as anger-evoking, and this effect occurred even for participants high in social 
anxiety. Based on these findings, Blaison et al. concluded that priming effects in the AMP are 
driven by the activation of “cold” semantic concepts rather than “hot” affective feelings. 
According to their account, angry faces activated semantic concepts of anger which in turn 
influenced participants’ responses to the Chinese ideographs. For affective feelings, the authors 
expected the opposite effect, given that angry faces may induce fear and therefore a tendency to 
judge the target ideograph as fear-evoking, not anger-evoking.  
Although activation of semantic concepts parsimoniously explains priming effects in 
AMP variants using either evaluative or semantic judgments, it is important to note that Blaison 
et al.’s (2012) results are still ambiguous with regard to the hypothesized role of affective 
feelings and semantic concepts. Specifically, one could argue that priming effects in Blaison et 
al.’s study could also be driven by processes of automatic facial mimicry (Dimberg, 1982; 
Lundqvist & Dimberg, 1995), which may elicit prime-congruent affective feelings through facial 
feedback (Strack, Martin, & Stepper, 1988). To the extent that these feelings are misattributed to 
the neutral Chinese ideographs, angry face primes should increase the likelihood of judging a 
given ideograph as anger-evoking, as observed by Blaison et al. (2012). Thus, although the 
available evidence suggests that priming effects in the AMP are not limited to primes with a 
clear affective quality (Deutsch & Gawronski, 2009; Imhoff et al., 2011; Sava et al., 2012), the 
respective contributions of affective feelings and semantic concepts are still unclear.  
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This ambiguity is further enhanced by the fact that both types of priming effects are 
consistent with a third explanation. Drawing on the notion of response priming, Wentura and 
Degner (2010) agued that priming effects in the AMP are driven by the activation of prepotent 
motor responses (see also Scherer & Lambert, 2009). A central aspect of response priming is that 
the mapping of valence to a given set of response options (e.g., positive mapped to a right-hand 
button press; negative mapped to a left-hand button press) creates a short-term association 
between the relevant stimulus features and their corresponding motor responses (see De Houwer, 
2003). Importantly, the activation of this association is not limited to the intentional evaluation of 
the targets, but it can also be activated unintentionally by response-irrelevant stimuli. As a result, 
brief presentations of a positive or negative prime may activate a prepotent response tendency to 
press the valence-congruent key, which may increase the likelihood of showing a corresponding 
response to the neutral target. This mechanism also accounts for priming effects in non-
evaluative, semantic variants of the AMP (Wentura & Degner, 2010). In Blaison et al.’s (2012) 
study, for example, the mapping of anger and fear to a particular set of response options may 
have created a short-term association between the task-relevant stimulus features and their 
corresponding motor responses. As a result, brief presentations of angry and fearful faces may 
activate a prepotent motor response to press the key that is congruent with the emotional 
expression of the presented face. These considerations imply that angry face primes should 
increase the likelihood of judging a given ideograph as anger-evoking, as observed in Blaison et 
al.’s study.  
In sum, although there is clear evidence that priming effects in the AMP are not limited 
to stimuli with a clear affective quality, previous research remains ambiguous about the role of 
affective feelings, semantic concepts, and prepotent motor responses as driving forces in the task. 
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Both the semantic concepts account and the motor response account parsimoniously explain 
priming effects in evaluative and semantic variants of the AMP. However, there are no data that 
could rule out affective feelings as a potential source of priming effects in evaluative variants of 
the AMP. Moreover, the currently available evidence remains ambiguous as to whether priming 
effects in semantic variants of the AMP are driven by the activation of semantic concepts or 
prepotent motor responses. 
The Present Research 
The main goal of the present research was test the three potential sources of priming 
effects in the AMP: (1) affective feelings, (2) semantic concepts, (3) prepotent motor responses. 
Testing the potential contribution of prepotent motor responses, Experiment 1 investigated 
whether priming effects in evaluative variants of the AMP are limited to conditions in which 
participants can form a short-term association between valence and a particular set of response 
options. Experiment 2 replicated the findings of Experiment 1 for a non-evaluative, semantic 
dimension. Addressing the potential contribution of affective feelings, Experiment 3 tested 
whether priming effects in the AMP occur for stimuli that elicit affective responses in the 
absence of semantic knowledge about these stimuli. Expanding on the results of the first three 
studies, Experiment 4 investigated whether the prime stimuli influence target responses through 
perceptual or misattribution processes.  
Experiment 1 
The main goal of Experiment 1 was to test the potential contribution of prepotent motor 
responses to priming effects in evaluative variants of the AMP. A central assumption of the 
motor response account is that the mapping of the task-relevant stimulus features (e.g., positive 
vs. negative) to a particular set of response options (e.g., right-hand button press vs. left-hand 
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button press) creates a short-term association between the two dimensions. These short-term 
associations are assumed to be activated by task-relevant features of the primes, such that the 
primes may elicit a prepotent response tendency to press a particular key. This account implies 
that priming effects in the AMP should be limited to conditions under which there is a consistent 
mapping between stimulus features and a particular set of response options. However, in the 
absence of a consistent stimulus-response mapping, priming effects should disappear. The latter 
outcome can be expected when the key assignment in the task varies randomly on a trial-by-trial 
basis, such that participants do not know which stimulus features will be mapped onto which 
response key at the time the prime appears on the screen. In other words, the activation of motor 
responses can be expected to produce reliable priming effects only when the key assignment in 
the AMP is fixed, but not when the key assignment varies randomly from trial to trial.  
A different prediction is implied by accounts in terms of affective feelings and semantic 
concepts. According to these accounts, the biasing effects of affective feelings or semantic 
concepts on target judgments do not require a consistent mapping of stimulus features and 
response sets. Instead, participants may use whatever response options they have to express their 
biased judgments of the targets, regardless of whether they do or do not know which key will be 
mapped onto which stimulus feature at the time the prime appears on the screen. Hence, from the 
perspective of these accounts, the activation of affective feelings or semantic concepts should 
produce reliable priming effects regardless of whether the key assignment in the task is fixed or 
random.  
To test these competing predictions, participants in Experiment 1 were primed with 
pleasant and unpleasant images before they were presented with the Chinese ideographs that 
were used as target stimuli. Participants’ task was to indicate whether they considered the 
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Chinese ideograph as visually more pleasant or visually less pleasant than the average Chinese 
ideograph. For half of the participants, the particular key assignment of more pleasant and less 
pleasant responses was fixed throughout the task. For the remaining half, the key assignment 
varied randomly on a trial-by-trial basis. 
Method 
Participants and Design. Fifty-five summer students (14 women, 41 men) at The 
University of Western Ontario were recruited for a study entitled “How do we make moral and 
evaluative judgments?” Subjects were paid CAD-$ 10 as a compensation for their participation 
in a one-hour session that included the current study and one additional study on an unrelated 
topic. The study included a 2 (Prime Valence: positive vs. negative) × 2 (Key Assignment: fixed 
vs. random) mixed-model design with the first variable as a within-subjects factor and the second 
one as a between-subjects factor.  
Materials and Procedure. The procedure of the AMP largely followed the general 
recommendations by Payne et al. (2005). On each trial of the task, participants were first 
presented with a fixation cross for 500 ms, which was replaced by a prime stimulus of either 
positive or negative valence for 75 ms. The presentation of the prime was followed by a blank 
screen for 125 ms, after which a Chinese ideograph appeared for 100 ms. The Chinese ideograph 
was then replaced by a black-and-white pattern mask, and participants were asked to make their 
response. Participants’ task was to indicate whether they considered the Chinese ideograph as 
visually more pleasant or visually less pleasant than the average Chinese ideograph. The pattern 
mask remained on the screen until participants gave their response. The next trial started after an 
inter-trial interval of 500 ms. In the fixed key-assignment condition, participants had to press a 
right-hand key (Numpad 5) when they considered the Chinese ideograph as visually more 
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pleasant than average and a left-hand key (A) when they considered the Chinese ideograph as 
visually less pleasant than average. In the random key-assignment condition, the key assignment 
was randomized on a trial-by-trial basis by the computer. Participants in both conditions were 
told that the key assignment will be displayed individually for each trial. The particular key 
assignment for a given trial appeared on the screen together with the black-and-white pattern 
mask that replaced the Chinese ideograph. As prime stimuli we used 5 positive and 5 negative 
pictures from the International Affective Picture System (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008). 
Each prime was presented 10 times, summing up to a total of 100 trials. As target stimuli, we 
used 100 distinct Chinese ideographs from Payne et al. (2005). Order of trials and prime-target 
combinations were randomized by the computer for each participant. Following the original 
instructions by Payne et al. (2005), participants in both conditions were told that the photographs 
can sometimes bias people’s responses to the Chinese ideographs, and that they should try their 
absolute best not to let the photographs bias their judgments of the Chinese ideographs in any 
possible way. 
Results 
Participants’ responses were aggregated by calculating the proportion of more pleasant 
responses for each of the two prime categories. Submitted to a 2 (Prime Valence) × 2 (Key 
Assignment) mixed-model ANOVA, these scores revealed a significant main effect of Prime 
Valence, F(1, 53) = 21.11, p < .001, ηp2 = .285, indicating that positive primes led to more 
favorable evaluations of the Chinese ideographs than negative primes (see Figure 1). 
Importantly, the two-way interaction of Prime Valence and Key Assignment was far from 
statistical significance, F(1, 53) = 0.06, p = .80, ηp2 = .001. The effect of Prime Valence was 
statistically significant when the key assignment was fixed, F(1, 27) = 13.62, p = .001, ηp2 = 
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.335, and when they key assignment varied randomly from trial to trial, F(1, 26) = 8.83, p = .006, 
ηp2 = .254. 
Discussion 
The main goal of Experiment 1 was to test whether priming effects in the AMP depend 
on consistent stimulus-response mappings. According to the motor response account, priming 
effects in the AMP should be limited to conditions under which the task-relevant stimulus 
features are consistently mapped to a particular set of response options. Counter to this 
prediction, we found significant priming effects regardless of whether they key assignment in the 
task was fixed or random. These findings challenge the activation of prepotent motor responses 
as a viable explanation of priming effects in the AMP (e.g., Wentura & Degner, 2010). Yet, they 
are consistent with accounts that attribute priming effects in the AMP to the activation of 
affective feelings (e.g., Payne et al., 2005) or semantic concepts (e.g., Blaison et al., 2012). In 
contrast to the motor response account, these accounts imply that participants may use whatever 
response options they have to express their biased judgments of the targets, regardless of whether 
the key assignment in the task is fixed or random. 
Experiment 2 
The main goal of Experiment 2 was to replicate the findings of Experiment 1 for an AMP 
variant using semantic rather than affective materials. Toward this end, participants were primed 
with images of men and women before they were presented with the Chinese ideographs that 
were used as target stimuli. Participants’ task was to guess whether the Chinese ideographs 
referred to either a male or a female name. For half of the participants, the key assignment of 
male and female responses was fixed throughout the task. For the remaining half, the key 
assignment varied randomly on a trial-by-trial basis. Drawing on the findings of Experiment 1, 
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we expected that the primes would produce a gender-congruent bias in participants’ responses to 
the Chinese ideographs regardless of whether the key assignment in the task is fixed or random. 
Method 
Participants and Design. Ninety-nine undergraduates (79 women, 20 men) at The 
University of Western Ontario were recruited for a battery of studies entitled “How do we make 
visual judgments?” which included the current experiment and two additional experiments on 
unrelated topics. Subjects received research credit for an introductory psychology course. The 
study included a 2 (Prime Gender: female vs. male) × 2 (Key Assignment: fixed vs. random) 
mixed-model design with the first variable as a within-subjects factor and the second one as a 
between-subjects factor. Eighteen participants of Asian background reported knowing the 
meaning of the Chinese ideographs. Data from these participants were excluded from analyses.  
Materials and Procedure. The procedural details of the AMP were similar to the ones in 
Experiment 1 with a few exceptions. Instead of using evaluative target categorizations, 
participants were asked to guess whether the Chinese ideograph referred to a male or a female 
name. In the fixed key-assignment condition, participants had to press a right-hand key (Numpad 
5) when they thought that the Chinese ideograph referred to a female name and a left-hand key 
(A) when they thought that the Chinese ideograph referred to a male name. In the random key-
assignment condition, the key assignment was randomized on a trial-by-trial basis by the 
computer. Participants in both conditions were told that the key assignment will be displayed 
individually for each trial. The particular key assignment for a given trial appeared on the screen 
together with the black-and-white pattern mask that replaced the Chinese ideograph. As prime 
stimuli, we used head-and-shoulder photographs of 5 women and 5 men. Each prime was 
presented 10 times, summing up to a total of 100 trials. The target stimuli were identical to 
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Experiment 1. Order of trials and prime-target combinations were again randomized by the 
computer for each participant. As with Experiment 1, participants were told that the photographs 
can sometimes bias people’s responses to the Chinese ideographs, and that they should try their 
absolute best not to let the photographs bias their judgments of the Chinese ideographs in any 
possible way. 
Results 
Participants’ responses were aggregated by calculating the proportion of female responses 
for each of the two prime categories. Submitted to a 2 (Prime Gender) × 2 (Key Assignment) 
mixed-model ANOVA, these scores revealed a significant main effect of Prime Gender, F(1, 79) 
= 24.63, p < .001, ηp2 = .238, indicating that participants were more likely to guess female when 
they were primed with a female face than when they were primed with a male face (see Figure 
2). The two-way interaction of Prime Gender and Key Assignment was far from statistical 
significance, F(1, 79) = 0.48, p = .49, ηp2 = .006. The effect of Prime Gender was statistically 
significant when the key assignment was fixed, F(1, 39) = 8.33, p = .006, ηp2 = .176, and when 
they key assignment varied randomly from trial to trial, F(1, 40) = 17.57, p < .001, ηp2 = .305.  
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 2 corroborate our conclusion that prepotent motor responses do 
not function as a driving force of priming effects in the AMP. Replicating the pattern obtained in 
Experiment 1, male and female prime stimuli produced a gender-congruent bias in guessing the 
meaning of the Chinese ideographs, and this priming effect occurred regardless of whether the 
key assignment in the task was fixed or random. Thus, taken together, the two studies challenge 
the motor response account as a viable explanation for priming effects in both evaluative and 
semantic variants of the AMP.  
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Experiment 3 
Although the results of Experiments 1 and 2 are inconsistent with the hypothesis that 
priming effects in the AMP are driven by the activation of prepotent motor responses, they do 
not provide definite information about the contribution of affective feelings versus semantic 
concepts. On the one hand, one could argue that the semantic concepts account is superior, 
because it can explain the results of both studies. Yet, affective feelings provide a viable 
explanation only for the results of Experiment 1, but not the results of Experiment 2. On the 
other hand, it is important to note that positive evidence for the contribution of semantic concepts 
in Experiment 2 does not rule out the potential contribution of affective feelings in Experiment 1. 
After all, it is possible that affective feelings and semantic concepts jointly contribute to priming 
effects in evaluative variants of the AMP. An unambiguous test of these assumptions would 
require prime stimuli that elicit affective feelings in the absence of semantic knowledge about 
these stimuli. To the extent that priming effects in evaluative variants of the AMP are eliminated 
in the absence of semantic knowledge about the primes, one could conclude that semantic 
concepts are indeed the exclusive source of priming effects in the AMP (cf. Blaison et al., 2012). 
However, if priming effects emerge for affect-eliciting primes even in the absence of semantic 
knowledge, the appropriate conclusion is that both affective feelings and semantic concepts can 
contribute to priming effects in the AMP (cf. Loersch & Payne, 2011).  
To test these competing predictions, Experiment 3 utilized a mere exposure manipulation 
to induce positive affective feelings toward unfamiliar stimuli in the absence of semantic 
knowledge about these stimuli (for a meta-analysis, see Bornstein, 1989). A central characteristic 
of mere exposure effects is that prior exposure to a stimulus can elicit positive affective feelings 
toward that stimulus through the enhanced fluency of processing the stimulus (Winkielman, 
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Huber, Kavanagh, & Schwarz, 2012). Because the elicitation of fluency-related positive affect 
does not require semantic knowledge about the stimulus, mere exposure provides an ideal means 
to test the role of affective feelings and semantic concepts in evaluative variants of the AMP. To 
the extent that the activation of semantic concepts represents the only source of priming effects 
in the AMP, prior exposure to unfamiliar prime stimuli should be insufficient to produce a 
priming effect. In contrast, if priming effects in the AMP can also be driven by affective feelings, 
unfamiliar prime stimuli that have been encountered before should produce more favorable 
responses to the target stimuli than unfamiliar prime stimuli that have not been encountered 
before. In the current study, we tested these predictions by comparing priming effects of artificial 
words that have been presented in a preceding task to the effects of artificial words that have not 
been presented before. To avoid inferences on the basis of a null effect in case mere exposure 
fails to produce a significant priming effect, we also included a control condition in which prior 
exposure to artificial words involved the simultaneous presentation of positive English words 
that ostensibly described the meaning of the artificial words. Based on the evidence for the role 
of semantic concepts in Experiment 2, we expected that positive translations of the artificial 
words should produce a significant priming effect regardless of whether affective feelings do or 
do not contribute to priming effects in the AMP.  
Method 
Participants and Design. Seventy undergraduates (39 women, 31 men) at The 
University of Western Ontario were recruited for a study entitled “How Do We Form First 
Impressions and Learn Foreign Languages?” The study was part of a one-hour session that 
included the current study and two additional studies on unrelated topics. Subjects received 
research credit for an introductory psychology course. The study included a 2 (Prime Type: 
AFFECT MISATTRIBUTION PROCEDURE  18 
presented vs. not presented) × 2 (Presentation Context: mere exposure vs. positive translation) 
mixed-model design with the first variable as within-subjects factor and the second one as a 
between-subjects factor.  
Materials and Procedure. Before participants completed the AMP, they were presented 
with artificial words as part of a language learning task. For half of the participants, the artificial 
words appeared individually on screen (mere exposure condition). For the remaining half, the 
artificial words were presented together with positive English words that ostensibly described the 
meaning of the artificial words (positive translation condition). Participants in both conditions 
were asked to memorize the artificial words. The presentations included five artificial words, 
each of which was presented 10 times for 1000 ms slightly above the center of the screen. For 
participants in the positive translation condition, a positive English word was simultaneously 
presented slightly below the center of the screen. The intertrial interval was 2000 ms. Order of 
trials was randomized individually for each participant. For the artificial words, we created two 
sets of five words. The artificial words of the first set were: nijaron, kadirga, felkani, lokanta, 
safmeri; the artificial words of the second set were: vikesta, tunbalo, latipor, belnica, gorikas. 
The artificial words of one set were presented as target stimuli in the language learning task 
(presented condition); the artificial words of the other set were used as control stimuli in the 
AMP without prior presentation (not-presented condition). The assignment of the two sets to the 
two conditions was counterbalanced across participants. As positive English words in the 
translation condition, we used: love, friend, happiness, holiday, summer. 
The basic procedure of the AMP was similar to the evaluative AMP with a fixed key-
assignment in Experiment 1. To test the effects of prior presentation and presentation context on 
priming effects in the AMP, the task included 12 presentations of the five artificial words that 
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were presented during the language learning task and 12 presentations of the five artificial words 
that were not presented before, summing up to a total of 120 trials. Order of trials and prime-
target combinations were randomized by the computer for each participant.  
Results 
AMP responses were aggregated by calculating the proportion of more pleasant 
responses for each of the two prime categories. Submitted to a 2 (Prime Type) × 2 (Presentation 
Context) mixed-model ANOVA, these scores revealed a marginally significant main effect of 
Presentation Context, F(1, 68) = 3.20, p = .08, ηp2 = .045, indicating that participants tended to 
evaluate the Chinese ideographs more favorably in the positive translation condition compared to 
the mere exposure condition. More importantly, the ANOVA also revealed a significant main 
effect of Prime Type, F(1, 68) = 15.40, p < .001, ηp2 = .185, indicating that artificial words that 
were presented before elicited more favorable evaluations of the Chinese ideographs than 
artificial words that were not presented before (see Figure 3). The two-way interaction of Prime 
Type and Presentation Context was far from statistical significance, F(1, 68) = 0.06, p = .81, ηp2 
= .001. The effect of Prime Type was statistically significant in the mere exposure condition, 
F(1, 34) = 9.34, p = .004, ηp2 = .215, as well as the translation condition, F(1, 34) = 6.34, p = 
.017, ηp2 = .157. 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 3 demonstrate that the activation of semantic concepts is not 
the exclusive source of priming effects in the AMP. Instead, priming effects can also be due to 
the affective feelings that are elicited by the primes. Using a mere exposure manipulation to 
create positive feelings toward unfamiliar prime stimuli in the absence of semantic knowledge 
about these stimuli, artificial prime words that were presented before led to more favorable 
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evaluations of the neutral Chinese ideographs when these words presented before than when they 
were not presented before. Together with the results of Experiment 2, these results suggest that 
priming effects in the AMP can be driven by either affective states or semantic concepts.  
Experiment 4 
The results of Experiments 1-3 specify what drives priming effects in the AMP: affective 
feelings and semantic concepts, but not prepotent motor responses. However, these studies do 
not provide any evidence regarding how affective feelings and semantic concepts produce 
priming effects in the AMP. The main goal of Experiment 4 was to test two alternative 
mechanisms by which affective feelings and semantic concepts may influence judgments about 
ambiguous target stimuli in the AMP: (1) misattribution of mental states and (2) biased 
perception of the target stimuli.  
Payne et al. (2005) argued that priming effects in the AMP are driven by the 
misattribution of the affective feelings that are elicited by the primes to the neutral target stimuli. 
Expanding on this hypothesis, Loersch and Payne (2011) proposed a general account that 
attributes priming effects of affective feelings and semantic concepts to a single misattribution 
mechanism. According to their situated-inference model, primes tend to influence behavior by 
altering the mental state of the perceiver (e.g., accessibility of semantic concepts; momentary 
affective feelings). In some cases, people mistakenly attribute these changes to their internal 
thought processes instead of the actual external source. If such misattribution occurs, the 
information implied by the mental state may influence behavior by serving as a basis for 
whatever behavioral decision is afforded by the current situation. As outlined by Loersch and 
Payne (2011), this account parsimoniously integrates various kinds of priming effects in the 
literature, including priming effects on judgments, behavior, and goal pursuit. Applied to the 
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AMP, an important aspect of the situated-inference model is that it includes both affective 
feelings and semantic concepts as potential mediators. For example, positive and negative primes 
may influence responses to the targets by altering either affective feelings or the accessibility of 
semantic concepts related to valence (e.g., good versus bad; pleasant versus unpleasant), which 
may be misattributed to the neutral targets unless these changes are directly bound to a specific 
object such as the prime (Oikawa et al., 2011).  
Although the AMP is commonly described as a misattribution task, Payne et al. (2005) 
also discussed an alternative mechanism that attributes priming effects to biased perceptions of 
the neutral Chinese ideographs. Instead of serving as a direct basis for judgments about the target 
stimuli as a result of misattribution, the biased perception account states that affective feelings 
and semantic concepts may influence judgments indirectly through the encoding of ambiguous 
stimulus characteristics (Srull & Wyer, 1980). Applied to the AMP, this account implies that the 
affective feelings and semantic concepts that are activated by the primes bias participants’ 
perception of the Chinese ideographs, and these biased perceptions may then provide the basis 
for their judgments (Payne et al., 2005).  
An important difference between the two accounts is that they make unique assumptions 
about the conditions under which a prime stimulus should influence judgments about an 
unrelated target stimulus. According to the misattribution account, priming effects depend on the 
mental state of the perceiver at the time of making the judgment. Thus, granted that the prime is 
presented close enough to the required judgment, it should not make a difference whether the 
mental state of the perceiver is altered before or after the encoding of the target stimulus. In 
contrast, the biased perception account implies that priming effects depend on the mental state of 
the perceiver at the time of encoding the target stimulus. If a prime stimulus influences the 
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mental state of the perceiver after the target has been encoded, the subjective perception of the 
target cannot be reversed, which should eliminate the impact of the prime (e.g., Srull & Wyer, 
1980; Trope, Cohen, & Alfieri, 1991). In the current study, we exploited these conflicting 
predictions to test the role of misattribution versus biased perception in the AMP. Whereas the 
misattribution account implies that priming effects in the AMP should occur regardless of 
whether the primes precede or follow the targets, the biased perception account implies that 
priming effects should be limited to trials on which the primes precede the targets. To ensure the 
generality of our findings, we tested these predictions for an evaluative and a semantic variant of 
the AMP using identical stimuli.  
Method 
Participants and Design. One-hundred summer students (75 women, 25 men) at The 
University of Western Ontario were recruited for a study entitled “Impression Formation and 
Visual Perception.” Subjects were paid CAD-$ 10 as a compensation for their participation in a 
one-hour session that included the current study and three additional studies on unrelated topics. 
The study used a 2 (Prime Valence: positive vs. negative) × 2 (Prime Semantics: animate vs. 
inanimate) × 2 (Prime-Target Order: prime-target vs. target-prime) × 2 (Target Categorization: 
evaluative vs. semantic) mixed-model design with the first three variables as within-subjects 
factors and the last one as a between-subjects factor. Thirteen participants of Asian background 
reported knowing the meaning of the Chinese ideographs. Data from these participants were 
excluded from analyses.  
Materials and Procedure. The AMP was similar to the one in Experiment 3 with a few 
important differences. First, instead of using artificial words as primes, the current study used 40 
English words depicting animate or inanimate objects of either positive or negative valence (see 
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Deutsch & Gawronski, 2009). Second, the current study manipulated the order of prime and 
target presentations on a within-subjects basis. On half of the trials the primes were presented 
first followed by the targets; on the remaining half the targets were presented first followed by 
the primes. Each of the 40 primes was presented once within each order condition, summing up 
to a total of 80 trials. Third, to ensure equal presentation times in the two order conditions, both 
primes and targets were presented for 100 ms with a blank screen being presented for 100 ms 
between the two stimuli. Fourth, the current study manipulated the type of target categorization. 
Participants in the semantic categorization condition were asked to guess whether the Chinese 
ideograph referred to an animate or inanimate object. Participants in the evaluative 
categorization condition were asked to guess whether the Chinese ideograph referred to a 
positive or negative object. The assignment of the two response keys (A and Numpad 5) to the 
respective responses was counterbalanced. Participants in both categorization conditions were 
instructed to focus on the Chinese ideographs and ignore the words. Participants were also told 
that the words can bias people’s guesses about the meaning of the Chinese ideographs, and that 
they should try their absolute best not to let the words bias their guesses about the meaning of the 
Chinese ideographs in any possible way.  
Results 
Participants’ responses were aggregated by calculating the proportion of positive or 
animate responses (depending on the categorization condition) for each of the eight within-
subjects conditions implied by the manipulations of prime valence, prime semantics, and prime-
target order. Thus, for the following analyses, animate responses in the semantic categorization 
condition were treated as equivalent to positive responses in the evaluative categorization 
condition and inanimate responses were treated as equivalent to negative responses. Submitted to 
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a 2 (Prime Valence) × 2 (Prime Semantics) × 2 (Prime-Target Order) × 2 (Target Categorization) 
mixed-model ANOVA, these scores revealed a significant main effect of Prime-Target Order, 
F(1, 85) = 5.25, p = .02, ηp2 = .058, a significant two-way interaction of Prime-Target Order and 
Target Categorization, F(1, 85) = 4.45, p = .04, ηp2 = .050, and a significant three-way 
interaction of Prime Valence, Prime Semantics, and Order, F(1, 85) = 5.35, p = .02, ηp2 = .059. 
More important for the current investigation, the ANOVA also revealed a significant main effect 
of Prime Valence, F(1, 85) = 23.01, p < .001, ηp2 = .213, and a significant main effect of Prime 
Semantics, F(1, 85) = 11.32, p < .001, ηp2 = .118. Both main effects were qualified by significant 
two-way interactions with Target Categorization (see Figure 4). The significant two-way 
interaction of Prime Valence and Target Categorization, F(1, 85) = 8.95, p = .004, ηp2 = .095, 
indicates that positive primes led to more positive responses than negative primes in the 
evaluative categorization condition, F(1, 42) = 21.70, p < .001, ηp2 = .341. Yet, positive primes 
did not lead to more animate responses than negative primes in the semantic categorization 
condition, F(1, 43) = 2.63, p = .11, ηp2 = .058. Conversely, the significant two-way interaction of 
Prime Semantics and Target Categorization, F(1, 85) = 15.03, p < .001, ηp2 = .150, indicates that 
animate primes led to more animate responses than inanimate primes in the semantic 
categorization condition, F(1, 43) = 14.47, p < .001, ηp2 = .252. However, animate primes did not 
lead to more positive responses than inanimate primes in the evaluative categorization condition, 
F(1, 42) = 0.89, p = .35, ηp2 = .021. These results replicate earlier findings by Deutsch and 
Gawronski (2009) showing significant effects of prime valence when the categorization task was 
evaluative but not when it was semantic, and significant effects of prime semantics when the 
categorization task was semantic but not when it was evaluative.  
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More important for the current investigation, the obtained two-way interactions remained 
unqualified by the order in which primes and targets were presented. Neither the three-way 
interaction of Prime Valence, Target Categorization, and Prime-Target Order, F(1, 85) = 0.55, p 
= .46, ηp2 = .006 (see Figure 4, left panel), nor the three-way interaction of Prime Semantics, 
Target Categorization, and Prime-Target Order was statistically significant F(1, 85) = 0.32, p = 
.57, ηp2 = .004 (see Figure 4, right panel). The effect of Prime Valence in the evaluative 
categorization condition was statistically significant regardless of whether the primes preceded 
the targets, F(1, 42) = 18.75, p < .001, ηp2 = .225, or the primes followed the targets, F(1, 42) = 
22.84, p < .001, ηp2 = .352. Similarly, the effect of Prime Semantics in the semantic 
categorization condition was statistically significant regardless of whether the primes preceded 
the targets, F(1, 43) = 12.50, p = .001, ηp2 = .225, or the primes followed the targets, F(1, 43) = 
14.50, p < .001, ηp2 = .256. The size of the two kinds of priming effects did not differ as function 
of Prime-Target Order for Prime Valence within the evaluative categorization condition, F(1, 42) 
= 0.22, p = .64, ηp2 = .005, and for Prime Semantics within the semantic categorization condition, 
F(1, 43) = 0.06, p = .81, ηp2 = .001.  
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 4 are consistent with accounts that attribute priming effects in 
the AMP to a general misattribution of prime-related mental states to the neutral Chinese 
ideographs (Loersch & Payne, 2011). However, they are inconsistent with accounts in terms of 
biasing effects of the primes on the perception of the target stimuli (Payne et al., 2005). 
Specifically, we found that word primes influenced participants’ responses to the Chinese 
ideographs regardless whether the primes were presented before or after the target stimuli. 
Supporting the generality of our conclusion, these effects emerged for both an evaluative and a 
AFFECT MISATTRIBUTION PROCEDURE  26 
semantic variant of the AMP using identical materials. Thus, together with the results of 
Experiments 1-3, these findings support accounts that attribute priming effects in the AMP to a 
general misattribution mechanism that can operate on both affective feelings and semantic 
concepts (Loersch & Payne, 2011).  
General Discussion 
The main goal of the current research was to investigate whether priming effects in the 
AMP are driven by the activation of (1) affective feelings, (2) semantic concepts, or (3) 
prepotent motor responses. Counter to the hypothesis that priming effects in the AMP might be 
driven by the activation of prepotent motor responses, priming effects on evaluative and 
semantic target responses occurred regardless of whether the key assignment in the task was 
fixed or random (Experiments 1 and 2). Moreover, priming effects emerged for semantic primes 
in the absence of affective feelings (Experiment 2) and for affect-eliciting primes in the absence 
of semantic knowledge (Experiment 3), indicating that both affective feelings and semantic 
concepts can contribute to priming effects in the AMP. Finally, priming effects on evaluative and 
semantic target responses were independent of the order in which primes and targets were 
presented, suggesting that priming effects in the AMP are driven by misattribution processes 
rather than biased perceptions of the target stimuli (Experiment 4). Taken together, these 
findings are consistent with the hypothesis that priming effects in the AMP are the result of a 
general misattribution mechanism that can operate on either affective feelings or semantic 
concepts (Loersch & Payne, 2011). According to this account, the prime stimuli alter the mental 
state of the perceiver (e.g., accessibility of semantic concepts; momentary affective feelings), 
which may be mistakenly attributed to internal thought processes rather than the primes. As a 
result, the information implied by the mental state may be used as a basis for judgments about 
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the ambiguous target stimuli, unless they are less diffuse and bound to a specific object such as 
the prime (Oikawa et al., 2011).  
Although activation of prepotent motor responses can explain the effects of both 
evaluative and semantic primes (Wentura & Degner, 2010), it is inconsistent with the finding 
that priming effects in the AMP emerged even when the key assignment in the task varied 
randomly on a trial-by-trial basis. According to this account, the mapping of a particular stimulus 
dimension to a particular set of response options creates a short-term association between the two 
dimensions. As a result, task-relevant stimulus features of the primes may activate associated 
motor reactions, which in turn influences the likelihood of showing a corresponding response to 
the neutral targets. Because the formation of short-term associations between stimulus features 
and response options is not limited to “hot” affective materials, this account can explain why 
priming effects in the AMP occur also for “cold” semantic materials. However, an important 
requirement for the activation of prepotent motor responses is the prior formation of a stimulus-
response association, which is undermined if the particular key assignment changes randomly 
from trial to trial (cf. De Houwer, 2003). Hence, the motor response account is unable to explain 
the current finding that priming effects occurred even when the key assignment in the AMP 
varied randomly on a trial-by-trial basis.  
An important question is how our findings can be reconciled with Blaison et al.’s (2012) 
conclusion that priming effects in the AMP are driven by “cold” semantic concepts rather than 
“hot” affective feelings. This conclusion was based on their finding that angry face primes 
increased the likelihood of judging a given ideograph as anger-evoking rather than fear-evoking, 
which may seem at odds with the results of our mere exposure study showing that affect-eliciting 
primes can influence target-responses in the absence of semantic knowledge about the primes. 
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There are at least two possible explanations that may resolve this inconsistency. First, it is 
possible that the primes in Blaison et al.’s study elicited processes of automatic facial mimicry 
(e.g., Dimberg, 1982; Lundqvist & Dimberg, 1995), which may induce prime-congruent 
affective feelings through facial feedback (Strack et al., 1988). Because priming effects of such 
mimicry-induced feelings would be congruent with the ones resulting from activated semantic 
concepts, there would be no inconsistency with our conclusion that priming effects in the AMP 
can be due to either affective feelings or semantic concepts. Second, the angry face primes in 
Blaison et al.’s study may have activated both affective feelings of fear and semantic concepts of 
anger, and their relative impact may depend on the nature of the categorization task. Specifically, 
one could argue that priming effects in the AMP are limited to those mental states that are most 
applicable to the judgmental task (cf. Loersch & Payne, 2011). In the current research, for 
example, priming effects of positive versus negative words were limited to evaluative target 
judgments, whereas priming effects of animate versus inanimate words were limited to 
corresponding semantic judgments. Applied to Blaison et al.’s findings, it is possible that the 
target judgment in their study involved a stronger cognitive focus (e.g., what are the visual 
characteristics of the ideograph?), thereby enhancing the impact of semantic concepts and 
reducing the impact of affective feelings. Yet, a target judgment that involves a stronger affective 
focus (e.g., how does ideograph make you feel?) might enhance the impact of affective feelings 
and reduce the impact of semantic concepts. Future research may help to clarify the potential 
influence of different target categorizations on priming effects of affective feelings and semantic 
concepts.  
An important issue in the context of the present studies is the possibility that participants 
intentionally use features of the primes to judge the targets. Evidence for such intentional effects 
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would not only undermine the suitability of the AMP as an implicit measure (De Houwer et al., 
2009); it would also provide an alternative explanation for the current findings, given that 
participants may use whatever prime characteristic can help to resolve the judgmental task 
regardless of whether the key assignment is fixed or random. Consistent with this concern, Bar-
Anan and Nosek (2012) found that AMP effects were positively correlated with self-reported 
intentional use of the primes in judging the targets. However, follow-up research by Payne et al. 
(2013) indicates that the value of such retrospective self-reports is rather limited for illuminating 
the causal mechanisms underlying AMP effects. In a series of studies, Payne et al. found that 
AMP effects were related to incoherent self-reports of both intentional and unintentional 
influences of the primes. Moreover, giving participants the option to skip a target judgment when 
they felt that their judgment would be influenced by the prime failed to reduce priming effects. 
Taken together, these results suggest that relations between AMP effects and self-reported 
intentional use of prime characteristics reflect retrospective confabulations rather than genuine 
causal effects of intentional processes. On the basis of this conclusion, it seems more appropriate 
to explain the current results in terms of misattributions of affective feelings and semantic 
concepts instead of intentional use of prime characteristics. 
Conclusion 
The main goal of the current research was to investigate the mechanisms underlying the 
AMP, which represents one of the most promising alternatives to the IAT to date. Our findings 
suggest that priming effects in the AMP are driven by the misattribution of affective feelings and 
semantic concepts, but there is no supportive evidence for the hypothesized role of prepotent 
motor responses. Although some researchers may interpret the two sources of priming effects as 
a threat against the validity of the AMP, we do not think that such a conclusion is warranted. Of 
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course, the current evidence indicates that priming effects in the AMP should not be interpreted 
as an unambiguous indicator of affective feelings, because priming effects in evaluative variants 
may also be driven by semantic concepts related to valence (e.g., good versus bad; pleasant 
versus unpleasant). However, this caveat does not imply that the AMP is an unreliable measure 
that lacks construct validity. Previous research has clearly demonstrated the validity of the AMP 
in predicting important real-life behaviors (for a meta-analysis, see Cameron et al., 2012). The 
current findings indicate that the predictive relations in these studies may be due to either 
affective feelings or semantic concepts (or both), and future research is needed to identify their 
affective versus cognitive underpinnings. Nevertheless, the finding that priming effects in the 
AMP can be driven by the activation of semantic concepts provides a theoretical foundation for 
applications involving the measurement of semantic associations. Thus, we hope that the current 
studies will stimulate future research on the affective versus cognitive underpinnings of previous 
findings with the AMP and novel applications to questions involving semantic associations.  
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Figure 1. Priming effects as a function of prime valence (positive vs. negative) and key 
assignment for evaluative target categorizations (fixed vs. random), Experiment 1. Higher values 
indicate higher proportions of positive responses. Error bars depict standard errors. 
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Figure 2. Priming effects as a function of prime gender (female vs. male) and key assignment for 
target gender guesses (fixed vs. random), Experiment 2. Higher values indicate higher 






































Figure 3. Priming effects as a function of prior presentation of prime (presented vs. not 
presented) and context during prior presentation (mere exposure vs. positive translation), 
Experiment 3. Higher values indicate higher proportions of positive responses. Error bars depict 
standard errors. 







































































Figure 4. Priming effects as a function of prime valence (positive vs. negative; see left panel), 
prime semantics (animate vs. inanimate; see right panel), and order of primes and targets (prime-
target vs. target-prime) on guesses regarding the evaluative versus semantic meaning of the 
target, Experiment 4. Higher values indicate higher proportions of positive responses for 
evaluative guesses and higher proportions of animate responses for semantic guesses. Error bars 
depict standard errors. 
 
